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Variations of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (PM-
MDI QKD) protocols have been investigated before, but it was recently discovered that this type of
protocol (under the name of twin-field QKD) can beat the linear scaling of the repeaterless bound
on secret key capacity. We propose a variation of PM-MDI QKD protocol, which reduces the sifting
cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as test states. We provide a security proof in
the infinite key limit. Our proof is conceptually simple and gives tight key rates. We obtain an
analytical key rate formula for the loss-only scenario, confirming the square root scaling and also
showing the loss limit. We simulate the key rate for realistic imperfections and show that PM-MDI
QKD can overcome the repeaterless bound with currently available technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] protocols
enable two distant parties (Alice and Bob) to estab-
lish information-theoretically secure private keys using a
quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel.
There is a wealth of QKD protocols around (see Ref. [3]
for a review). A bottleneck for QKD applications, be it
as individual link or as part of a network, is the scaling of
the generated secret key rate with the loss in the channel
represented by the single-photon transmissivity η. The
best-known QKD protocols have a scaling of their key
rate in the limit of infinite channel uses (infinite key limit)
as R∞ = O(η), and by now we have bounds on repeater-
less optical channels which show that this is the optimal
rate scaling that can be achieved [4, 5]. The tight bound
on the performance of QKD in terms of secret key rate
per employed optical mode is given by R∞ ≤ log2 11−η
[5], which can be saturated [6]. In principle, inserting in-
termediate stations performing some operations can im-
prove the performance, and quantum repeaters [7] aim
at this. The field of quantum repeater research is very
active and made conceptual and practical advances over
the recent years, but as of today, no quantum repeater
has been demonstrated yet that would outperform the
direct use of optical channels, and thus breaking the re-
peaterless bounds.
While proposals have been made for simplest possi-
ble devices that allow a demonstration of quantum re-
peater action by beating repeaterless bounds using a
simple single-node layout [8], the corresponding quan-
tum advantage has not been experimentally demon-
strated yet. In a pleasant surprise to the field, the
phase-matching measurement-device-independent proto-
cols (PM-MDI) [9, 10] were recently shown to beat the
repeaterless bound when using suitable test states [11].
This important observation justifiably creates quite an
interest in the community. In the original paper [11], it
has been argued that the secret key rate in the infinite
key limit indeed scales as R∞ = O(
√
η), where we keep η
as the single-photon transmissivity of the total distance,
rather than that of a segment. It is interesting to see
that an MDI protocol can achieve that performance with-
out the use of any quantum memory or similar advanced
components. Remarkably, the only difference to previous
MDI QKD protocols that show a scaling of R∞ = O(η) is
the change from single-photon signals (or mixture of pho-
ton number states) with two-photon interference events
at the beam splitter, to coherent states as signal states
and single-photon interference events at the beam split-
ter.
So far, the security analyses [12, 13] of the PM-MDI
QKD protocols have been done in a framework based on
the quantum error correction inspired approach by Shor-
Preskill [14], which is improved by Koashi [15], and later
extended to work with a wider class of privacy ampli-
fication protocols [16]. However, for security proofs in
this framework, due to some pessimistic estimation of
the phase error rate, the key rate bound can potentially
be loose. Also, the variations of the protocol proposed in
[12, 13] require phase-randomization on the signal states
and thus introduce a large sifting cost. The goal of the
present paper is two-fold. We propose a variation of the
PM-MDI QKD protocol that clearly distinguishes be-
tween test states, meant to probe potential eavesdropping
activities, and signal states, which are meant to establish
secret keys and are not phase randomized. For this mod-
ified protocol we then execute a security analysis which is
expected to be tight as it uses the framework by Renner
[17]. This framework is known to be flexible in terms of
error correction and privacy amplification methods, and
is general enough to be adaptable to any generic QKD
protocol. It is interesting to point out that even though
these two frameworks have been generally considered in-
dependent of each other in the community, recently there
has been an effort to unify these two different security
proof frameworks [18].
We will first analyze the security of the protocol in a
setting with infinitely many different test states, similar
to the initial discussion of decoy states in weak coherent
pulse BB84 protocols [19]. In this setting, we can derive
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2an analytical key rate formula for the scenario where Al-
ice and Bob observe correlations coming from a loss-only
scenario. We derive the general framework that includes
also the noisy case, for which we then resort to numerical
evaluations to demonstrate the stability of the proposed
protocol.
Since the test states in our protocol are non-phase-
randomized coherent states, we do not apply the decoy
state analysis. Instead of using phase-randomized co-
herent states to simulate a classical mixture of photon
number states, we directly use the properties of coherent
states to perform a variation of tomography on the quan-
tum channel and untrusted measurement devices. Our
approach thus generalizes the decoy state idea to the use
of general test states to test the channel and to deduce
information about the adversary’s attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, this approach has not been used in the
context of QKD security proof and might be interesting
to apply a similar approach to other QKD protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe
our version of the PM-MDI protocol in Sec. II A, and we
then compare different variations of the PM-MDI proto-
col in Sec. II B and highlight how our variation (and our
proof idea) differs from other works. Next, we describe
the framework for our security proof and procedures for
key rate calculation in Sec. III. We then simulate the
key rates with the loss-only scenario and with realistic
experimental imperfections in Sec. IV. Finally, in Sec.
V, we summarize our results and provide insights for fu-
ture work. Some technical details relevant for the key
rate calculation are presented in the appendixes.
II. PM-MDI QKD PROTOCOLS
In this section, we first present an idealized version
of PM-MDI QKD in the sense that Alice and Bob use
infinitely many coherent states as test states in the pro-
tocol, similar to the initial discussion of decoy states in
weak coherent pulse BB84 protocols [19]. We will prove
its security in this paper. Then, we will compare differ-
ent variations of PM-MDI QKD protocols. In the next
section, when we prove the security of the idealized ver-
sion of our protocol, we will also provide insights for the
security analysis of a practical version of this protocol
with a small number of choices of test states.
A. Description of our protocol
(1) Test/key-generation mode selection. Alice (Bob)
chooses a random bit mA (mB) according to a priori
probability distribution {pA, 1 − pA} ({pB , 1 − pB}). If
mA = 0, Alice then labels this round as in the key-
generation mode. If mA = 1, Alice labels this round
as in the test mode and similarly for Bob.
(2) State preparation. If the test mode is chosen, Alice
(a) (b)
FIG. 1. (a). Schematic setup of the PM-MDI QKD pro-
tocol. Alice and Bob send coherent states to the untrusted
third party Charlie in the middle, who performs measure-
ments and broadcasts outcomes. BS: 50-50 beam splitter.
D+, D−: single-photon detectors. (b). Equivalent view of
the protocol. Eve is assumed to perform the measurements
in the middle. Effectively, Eve performs a 4-element POVM,
denoted as {F+, F−, F ?, F d}, corresponding to four possible
announcements {D+ clicks, D− clicks, no detectors click, both
detectors click}, which are abbreviated as {+,−, ?, d}.
(Bob) then randomly chooses a phase θA (θB) ∈ [0, 2pi)
and randomly chooses an intensity µA (µB). Then she
(he) prepares a coherent state
∣∣√µAeiθA〉 ( ∣∣√µBeiθB〉)
and sends it to the untrusted third party Charlie through
the quantum channel.
If the key-generation mode is chosen, Alice (Bob) ran-
domly generates a bit value kA (kB) ∈ {0, 1} with a
uniform probability distribution. Alice (Bob) chooses
the pre-agreed intensity µ and sends a coherent state∣∣√µeipikA〉 (∣∣√µeipikB〉) to Charlie.
(3) Measurements. For each round, Charlie performs
a joint measurement on the signals received from Alice
and Bob, and then makes an announcement about the
measurement outcome. If Charlie is honest, he is sup-
posed to perform the measurement as shown in Fig. 1(a)
and announces one of the following outcomes {“Only de-
tector D+ clicks”, “Only detector D− clicks”, “No detec-
tors click”, “Both detectors click”}, which, for the later
convenience of notation, we abbreviate as {+,−, ?, d},
respectively. We denote Charlie’s announcement as γ
throughout this paper.
After steps 1-3 are repeated for many times, and after
Charlie has made all the announcements, Alice and Bob
then proceed with the following steps.
(4) Sifting. Alice and Bob use an authenticated classi-
cal channel to communicate and sort all rounds into two
disjoint sets, where one set is used for the key generation
and the other is for the parameter estimation. To do so,
they disclose the choices of mA and mB for each round
and also use the announcement γ. If mA = mB = 0,
that is, they both selected the key-generation mode for
a given round, and Charlie announced γ ∈ {+,−}, they
save their data corresponding to this round for the key
3generation. All remaining rounds are used for parameter
estimation.
(5) Parameter estimation. To perform parameter
estimation, Alice and Bob disclose the choices of
µA, µB , θA, θB (also kA, kB if they have chosen one for
that round) for the rounds in the set labeled for parame-
ter estimation and also use the announcement result γ for
each of these rounds to estimate how Eve has interacted
with the signals during their exchange in the protocol. If,
from their analysis, they find out that Eve has learned
too much about the signals and no secret keys can be
generated, then they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they
continue.
(6) Key map. Alice forms a raw key using her bit value
kA from each of the rounds saved for the key generation.
(In principle, Bob does not need to do anything in this
step since he can correctly determine Alice’s key by the
error correction. In practice, depending on the choice of
error correction code, it might be convenient for Bob to
flip his bit value when the announcement is γ = “− ”.)
(7) Error correction and privacy amplification. Alice
and Bob then apply the procedures of error correction
and privacy amplification as in a typical QKD protocol
to generate a secret key.
We remark that since this protocol uses an MDI setup,
it is inherently immune to all side channels in the mea-
surement devices once its security is proven. However,
Alice and Bob’s sources have to be trusted and protected.
In our security analysis, we assume that Alice and Bob’s
devices are fully characterized and Eve has no access.
This assumption needs to be justified in the experimental
implementations of the protocol. In particular, we want
to remark that the choices of mA and mB (also kA and
kB) should not be leaked to Eve by side channels before
the announcement is made. In the implementation of the
protocol, Alice and Bob need to make sure that Eve can-
not distinguish the key-generation mode from test mode
by any classical side information leaked from their de-
vices before Charlie’s announcement. Just like other MDI
QKD protocols, this protocol can be vulnerable to side-
channel attacks on the sources.
We also comment on the the choices of parameters pA,
pB . While values of pA, pB need to be optimized in the
finite-key regime, in the infinite key limit, we can choose
pA and pB arbitrarily close to 1 so that the sifting factor
is asymptotically 1, like the efficient BB84 protocol [20].
Finally, we remark on the choices of µA and µB
and their corresponding probability distributions. Since
states in the test mode essentially are used to perform a
tomography on Eve’s attacks on the subspace of signal
states used in the key-generation mode, for the purpose
of this paper, we initially use coherent states whose com-
plex amplitudes cover the entire complex space. In the
infinite key limit, the probability distribution (with no
zeros) does not matter. We will remark on how a finite
number of choices of test states can approximately ac-
complish the same task and the choices of µA and µB
will then be closely related to the value of µ.
B. Comparison of different variations of PM-MDI
QKD protocols
Many variations of the PM-MDI QKD protocol have
been proposed and investigated. Different names have
been assigned to different variations, such as, phase-
encoding scheme for MDI [9], MDI-B92 [10], twin-field
QKD (TF-QKD) [11] and phase-matching QKD (PM-
QKD) [12]. However, they all have the essential compo-
nents needed to achieve the rate scaling of R∞ = O(
√
η),
namely, they all use coherent states as signal states and
rely on single-photon interference events at the beam
splitter of an untrusted intermediate node, even though
not all variations can indeed achieve this scaling.
We first describe the common features of all those pro-
tocols and then discuss how each variation differs in the
following two aspects: choices of signal states used for
establishing secret keys and choices of test states used to
probe Eve’s attacks.
In an ideal PM-MDI QKD protocol, Alice and Bob will
only establish keys from the rounds where each of them
has selected a state from the set {|+α〉 , |−α〉}, where α
can be an arbitrary complex number. In other words, Al-
ice and Bob will only establish keys from the rounds that
satisfies the phase-matching condition, that is, they have
chosen the same global phase and same intensity for their
states. We call two coherent states {|+α〉 , |−α〉} with
only a pi phase difference as a phase-matching pair. In
addition, Alice and Bob may decide to send some states
as test states to probe eavesdropping activities for ran-
domly selected rounds and those rounds will be used in
the parameter estimation step only. Alice and Bob will
send their states to an untrusted party Charlie at the
intermediate node for measurements. An honest Charlie
will use the single-photon interference events at the beam
splitter for his announcement.
Since this type of protocol is measurement-device in-
dependent and generates keys when Alice and Bob use
the same phase-matching pair of coherent states, phase-
matching measurement-device-independent QKD is in
our view a more descriptive name that captures impor-
tant features of this type of protocol.
Now, we compare some variations of PM-MDI QKD.
Different variations may use different number of phase-
matching pairs as signal states and may use different
types of states as test states, such as a mixture of pho-
ton number states (phase-randomized coherent states),
partially phase-randomized coherent states, or coherent
states without phase randomization. Some variations
may use the same number of phase-matching pairs as sig-
nal states, but differ in how to handle them. We present
those variations just for the comparison purpose and we
do not neither claim this is an exhausted list nor verify
4the security analysis of each work.
(1) The variation proposed in Ref. [9] is called phase
encoding scheme I for MDI. This protocol essentially uses
two phase-matching pairs of coherent states. In the orig-
inal description of the protocol, these two pairs are la-
beled as two bases, similar to a BB84-type protocol, due
to the proof technique adopted. In an abstract descrip-
tion, we can view this protocol as essentially using one
phase-matching pair of coherent states as signal states
and an additional pair as test states. Because of the
proof technique and a limited number of test states, the
scaling R∞ = O(
√
η) was not found.
(2) The variation studied in Ref. [10] is called MDI-
B92 protocol. Reference [10] analyzes different types of
measurements for the intermediate node. Under the in-
vestigation of unambiguous state discrimination attacks,
it basically proposes a variation of PM-MDI protocol
with exactly one phase-matching pair of coherent states
as the signal states and no test states. Because there are
no test states, this protocol is not expected to have the
scaling R∞ = O(
√
η).
(3) The variation proposed in Ref. [11] has the name
of TF-QKD protocol. This protocol uses infinitely
many phase-matching pairs of coherent states (phase-
randomized coherent states) as signal states. In addi-
tion, for the purpose of security analysis, each round is
assigned to one of two bases to mimic a BB84-type proto-
col. Instead of achieving the perfect phase-matching con-
ditions, this protocol allows some small errors in identify-
ing whether Alice and Bob have chosen the same phase-
matching pair. To distill keys, Alice and Bob disclose
some partial information about the global phases. If their
global phases only differ by a small amount, they assume
they have used the same phase-matching pair. Due to the
phase-matching condition, the sifting cost of this protocol
can be large, which affects the prefactor of key rate. In
this protocol, states used as test states are effectively the
same as states used for signal states. These test states are
partially phase-randomized coherent states as Eve knows
some partial information about the global phase. Refer-
ence [11] argued that this type of protocol can have the
O(
√
η) rate scaling.
(4) The variation investigated in Ref. [12] uses the
name PM-QKD protocol. Like TF-QKD [11], it also uses
infinitely many phase-matching pairs of coherent states
as signal states and adopts a procedure similar to that
in Ref. [11] in identifying whether Alice and Bob have
chosen the same phase-matching pair for each round. It
also uses partially phase-randomized coherent states as
test states. The difference from TF-QKD is that there is
no assignment of basis choice for each round. This work
shows the O(
√
η) rate scaling and its security analysis
does not use standard decoy state methods.
(5) The variation studied in Ref. [13] is called TF-
QKD∗ protocol. This protocol, similar to the original
TF-QKD protocol, uses infinitely many phase-matching
pairs as signal states and later postselects on rounds
where the global phases are different by less than a
small amount. Effectively, by allowing some errors, Alice
and Bob assume that they have chosen the same phase-
matching pair when the difference in their global phases
is small. This protocol also has an assignment of basis
choice for each round in order to apply a BB84-type se-
curity argument. Unlike the original TF-QKD protocol,
this protocol uses a mixture of photon number states as
test states. The security analysis applies the standard
decoy state methods and shows O(
√
η) rate scaling.
(6) The variation proposed in Ref. [21] is also called
PM-QKD protocol. It uses exactly one phase-matching
pair as signal states and uses a mixture of photon number
states as test states.
(7) The variation studied in Ref. [22] is referred as a
TF-QKD type protocol. This variation essentially is the
same as in Ref. [21]. It uses exactly one phase-matching
pair as signal states and uses a mixture of photon num-
ber states as test states. These two works differ by the
security proof methods.
(8) In this paper, we propose a modified PM-MDI
QKD protocol. Our protocol uses exactly one phase-
matching pair as signal states and infinitely many dif-
ferent coherent states (without phase randomization) as
test states. Our security analysis does not use the stan-
dard decoy state method since our test states are not
mixtures of photon number states. We rely on the to-
mographic reconstruction of POVM elements using the
coherent states as test states to prove the security.
In the end, we remark on the advantages of differ-
ent types of test states. Phase-randomized weak coher-
ent state sources are used to approximate single-photon
sources and test states of this type are used to esti-
mate the single-photon contribution. Using a mixture
of photon number states as test states allows the stan-
dard decoy state analysis, which has been investigated
and well understood. In addition, using a small num-
ber of decoy states [23, 24] as test states has been in-
vestigated in many other protocols and might be readily
adapted to some variations of PM-MDI QKD protocol.
On the other hand, using non-phase-randomized coher-
ent states as test states, we directly use properties of
coherent states, that is, they are overcomplete and non-
orthogonal to each other. Test states of this type have
the potential to give tighter key rates, as we will demon-
strate in this paper when using infinitely many coherent
states. Also, no phase randomization is required in the
experimental implementations.
III. SECURITY PROOF
To prove the security of a QKD protocol, the ulti-
mate goal is to provide a full security proof following
5the -security definition of QKD [17, 25] in the frame-
work of universal composability. Currently, there are
well-developed techniques to simplify the problem, such
as, the quantum de Finetti theorem [17], so-called post-
selection technique [26], and the entropy accumulation
theorem [27, 28]. These techniques allow us to prove the
security in a two-step procedure. In the first step, we
prove the security against collective attacks in the infi-
nite key scenario, and in the second step we apply one
of the mentioned techniques to extend the analysis to
a full security proof against general attacks, including
finite-size effects. The scope of this paper is to prove the
first step, namely the analysis of the collective attack in
the infinite key limit. We leave technical details of the
extension to the full security for the future work.
To prove the security of this protocol against collective
attacks, we first apply the source-replacement scheme
[29, 30] to both Alice and Bob’s sources and convert
this protocol to its equivalent entanglement-based pro-
tocol. Then we proceed to prove the security of the
entanglement-based version by evaluating the secret key
generation rate.
A. Source-replacement scheme
For the purpose of clarifying notations, let us start
with a more abstract view of the protocol. In each
round, Alice chooses a state from the set of possible sig-
nal states {|ϕx〉} according to a priori probability dis-
tribution {px} and similarly, Bob chooses a state from
the same set {|ϕy〉} with a priori probability distribu-
tion {qy}. Then in the source-replacement scheme, Alice
and Bob’s sources effectively prepare the following state
|Ψ〉ABA′B′
=
(∑
x
√
px |x〉A |ϕx〉A′
)
⊗
(∑
y
√
qy |y〉B |ϕy〉B′
)
=
∑
x,y
√
pxqy |x, y〉AB |ϕx, ϕy〉A′B′ ,
(1)
where the register A records the choices of states pre-
pared in the register A′ and similarly the register B
records the choices of states in the register B′. We intro-
duce an orthonormal basis {|x〉A} for the register system
A corresponding to states {|ϕx〉}, and an orthonormal
basis {|y〉B} for the register system B corresponding to
states {|ϕy〉}. It is crucial that Eve has no access to the
registers A and B. Then, Alice keeps the register A and
sends the system A′ to Charlie, and similarly, Bob keeps
B and sends B′. To learn their choices of states sent to
Charlie for each round, Alice performs a local measure-
ment described by a positive-operator valued measure
(POVM) MA = {|x〉〈x|} on her register A and likewise,
Bob applies his POVM MB = {|y〉〈y|} to his register B.
Importantly, we only apply the source-replacement
scheme for the signal states in the key-generation mode
since the test states in the test mode are only used to put
constraints on how Eve acts in the subspace spanned by
signal states. We denote the set of signal states in the
key-generation mode as S, that is,
S ={|+√µ,+√µ〉 , |−√µ,−√µ〉 ,
|+√µ,−√µ〉 , |−√µ,+√µ〉}, (2)
where each state is a two-mode coherent state coming
from both Alice and Bob, and we dropped the subscript
A′B′ for the ease of writing. Since finitely many coherent
states are linearly independent, we want to point out that
S is indeed a basis of span(S).
B. Description of Eve’s attack
As an MDI QKD protocol, Eve has a full control of
both the quantum channels connecting Alice, Bob and
the intermediate node Charlie, and the measurement de-
vices at the intermediate node. Since measurement de-
vices are neither characterized nor trusted, Eve is as-
sumed to play the role of Charlie to perform the mea-
surement. Therefore, in the PM-MDI QKD protocol,
we can view the protocol in an alternative and equiv-
alent picture, as shown in Fig. 1(b). In order to make
an announcement strategy, Eve performs some measure-
ment, which can be described by a POVM F , directly
on the states from Alice and Bob in the registers A′ and
B′. Moreover, without loss of generality, we can assume
that F only has four elements since only {+,−, ?, d} out-
comes are meaningful for Alice and Bob, and all other
outcomes are simply discarded in the protocol. (Even
though Alice and Bob may only keep {+,−} outcomes
to distill keys, we are allowed to include {?, d} outcomes
for parameter estimation.) We write this POVM F as
F = {F+, F−, F ?, F d}, or abbreviate it as {F γ} for
γ ∈ {+,−, ?, d}. The probability of announcing the out-
come γ is Tr(F γσA′B′) for an input state σA′B′ .
From Alice and Bob’s point of view, they can only
know the probability of each announcement, not the post-
measurement states in Eve’s hand. They can infer what
POVM F that Eve applied from their observed correla-
tions. However, Eve can perform a nondestructive mea-
surement and keep her post-measurement states for fur-
ther analysis. That is, Eve applies a completely posi-
tive trace-preserving (CPTP) map EA′B′→EC on the in-
put quantum states in the registers A′ and B′. Her an-
nouncement about the measurement outcome is stored
in the classical register C and she keeps the postmea-
surement state in the register E. Here, we introduce an
orthonormal basis {|γ〉} for the register C, each of which
corresponds to every possible announcement outcome. In
general, we can write EA′B′→EC as follows:
EA′B′→EC(X) =
∑
γ
Eγ(X)⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C , (3)
where each Eγ is a completely positive trace non-
increasing map and X is an arbitrary linear operator on
the systems A′B′.
6In the Choi-Kraus representation, each Eγ can be writ-
ten as
Eγ(X) =
∑
j∈I(γ)
Kγj X(K
γ
j )
†, (4)
with
∑
j(K
γ
j )
†Kγj = F
γ and the summation going over
some index set I(γ) that depends on γ. Without loss of
generality we can use maps Eγ(X) with a single Kraus
operator Kγ =
√
F γ . The reason for this is that the
general case of Eqs. (3) and (4) can be represented as a
concatenation of two maps, the first one using the case
of Kγ =
√
F γ , followed by a second channel operation
that is conditioned on the classical register C and uses
Kraus operators K˜γj = K
γ
j (F
γ)−1/2. To see this, we
need only to verify two things: (a) the concatenation
of both operations gives the general form and (b) the
Kraus operators K˜γj for each value of γ define a valid
CPTP map. The proof of (a) is trivial, and for (b) we
need only to verify that
∑
j∈Iγ
(
K˜γj
)†
K˜γj = 1γ , where
1γ is the projector onto the support of F
γ and (F γ)−1/2
is the corresponding pseudoinverse of
√
F γ . We insert
the definition to find∑
j∈I(γ)
(
K˜γj
)†
K˜γj
=
∑
j∈I(γ)
(F γ)−1/2
(
Kγj
)†
Kγj (F
γ)−1/2
=(F γ)−1/2
 ∑
j∈I(γ)
(
Kγj
)†
Kγj
 (F γ)−1/2
=(F γ)−1/2F γ(F γ)−1/2
=1γ .
(5)
Clearly, since the general case can thus be considered as
a two-step procedure, where the first step gives rise to
the announcement γ and the second step acts only on
Eve’s conditional states, it can only strengthen Eve’s po-
sition by not forcing her to do this second step. Without
loss of generality, we can thus assume that Eve’s optimal
strategy performs only the first step.
Since we assume the sources are protected, Eve cannot
have the access to the registers A and B and cannot
modify the states in those registers. Therefore, when
Eve directly acts on the state |Ψ〉ABA′B′ shown in Eq.
(1) from the source-replacement scheme, the joint state
ρABEC shared by Alice, Bob and Eve along with the
classical register C for announcements is as follows:
ρABEC = (1AB ⊗ EA′B′→EC)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|ABA′B′)
=
∑
x,y,x′,y′
√
pxpx′qyqy′ |x, y〉〈x′, y′|AB
⊗
∑
γ
(
√
F γ |ϕx, ϕy〉〈ϕx′ , ϕy′ |
√
F γ)E ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C .
(6)
C. Key rate evaluation with Devetak-Winter
formula
To distill keys from ρABEC , Alice and Bob perform
measurements using POVMs MA on the register A and
MB on the register B, respectively. Upon measurements,
Alice stores her measurement outcomes in a classical reg-
ister X and Bob stores his in a classical register Y . Alice
then applies a key map that maps her measurement result
in the register X to a raw key bit in the register K. We
want to point out that the key map step is necessary, but
the key map can be trivial, as it is in this PM-MDI QKD
protocol. The key map here is an identity map from the
register X to the register K. Let G denote the effective
CPTP map that transforms ρABEC to ρKYEC . In the
end, we generate keys from the state ρKYEC , which has
the form
ρKYEC =G(ρABEC)
=
∑
k,y,γ
p(γ)p(k, y|γ) |k〉〈k|K ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y
⊗ ρk,y,γE ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C ,
(7)
where ρk,y,γE is Eve’s conditional state conditioned on Al-
ice holding k in the register K, Bob having y in the reg-
ister Y and the central node announcing γ. Here, p(γ)
is a marginal probability of the joint probability distri-
bution p(k, y, γ) and p(k, y|γ) = p(k,y,γ)p(γ) is a conditional
probability.
Under collective attacks, we can evaluate the secret
key generation rate using Devetak-Winter formula [31],
which is expressed in terms of a single-copy state ρKYEC
shared by Alice, Bob and Eve.
As is typical in the MDI protocols, we can choose to
generate keys from each announcement outcome γ inde-
pendently as the announcement is available to all parties.
We rewrite ρABEC by defining conditional states of Alice,
Bob and Eve conditioned on the announcement outcome
γ as
ργKY E =
∑
k,y
p(k, y|γ) |k〉〈k|K ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρk,y,γE , (8)
and ρKYEC =
∑
γ p(γ)ρ
γ
KY E ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C .
We adapt the Devetak-Winter formula to a general
case where the error correction is not necessarily per-
formed at the Shannon limit. In that case, the number
of secret bits that we can distill from the state ργKY E is
r(ργKY E), which is defined as
r(ργKY E) = max [1− δγEC − χ(K : E)ργKYE , 0], (9)
where δγEC is the amount of information leakage per sig-
nal during the error correction step for the rounds corre-
sponding to the announcement outcome γ, and
χ(K : E)ργKYE = S(ρ
γ
E)−
∑
k
p(k|γ)S(ρk,γE ) (10)
7is the Holevo information, where S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) is
the von Neumann entropy. The states ργE and ρ
k,γ
E are
defined as:
ρk,γE :=
∑
y
p(k, y|γ)
p(k|γ) ρ
k,y,γ
E
=
∑
y
p(y|k, γ)ρk,y,γE ,
ργE :=
∑
k
p(k|γ)ρk,γE .
(11)
In the Shannon limit, we have 1−δγEC = I(K : Y )ργKYE ,
where I(K : Y )ργKYE is the classical mutual information,
and thus we recover the original Devetak-Winter formula
in Eq. (9). Another important observation is that δγEC
is directly determined from the experimentally observed
correlations.
The total number of secret bits that we can distill from
the state ρKYEC , denoted by r˜(ρKYEC), is defined as
r˜(ρKYEC) =
∑
γ
p(γ)r(ργKY E). (12)
From Eq. (6), we can calculate Eve’s conditional states
ρk,y,γE as
ρk,y,γE =
∣∣∣Θγk,y〉〈Θγk,y∣∣∣ , (13)
where we define∣∣∣Θγk,y〉 = √F γ |ϕk, ϕy〉√〈ϕk, ϕy|F γ |ϕk, ϕy〉 . (14)
Then, by substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (11), we can
calculate the conditional states ργE and ρ
k,γ
E , and evaluate
χ(K : E)ργKYE in Eq. (10) to obtain r(ρ
γ
KY E) in Eq. (9).
From the relation between ρABEC and {F γ} shown
in Eq. (6), we notice that a full knowledge of {F γ}
gives us a full knowledge of ρABEC and thus we can
determine the key rate using Eq. (12). However, if we
cannot uniquely determine F γ , then we cannot uniquely
determine ρABEC . In that case, we have a set of com-
patible density operators ρABEC , that is, C = {ρABEC :
ρABEC is compatible with experimental observations}.
Thus, we need to consider the worst-case scenario
by taking the minimum of r˜ over the set C , or
equivalently, over the set C = {ρKYEC : ρKYEC =
G(ρABEC), where ρABEC ∈ C }.
In this situation, the asymptotic key rate R∞ should
be expressed as
R∞ = min
ρKYEC∈C
r˜(ρKYEC)
= min
ρABEC∈C
r˜(G(ρABEC)).
(15)
The essential part of the optimization is to optimize the
Holevo information χ(K : E) by finding the all possible
Eve’s conditional states, which are needed to evaluate
Eq. (10).
We remark that most of the discussion so far is general
to a generic MDI QKD protocol. In the next section, we
will adapt this procedure to our specific PM-MDI QKD
protocol.
D. Determination of Eve’s POVM for PM-MDI
QKD
As discussed in the previous sections, knowing Eve’s
POVM elements allows us to calculate the key rate, since
the minimization in Eq. (15) is now over a set containing
only one element. We will now explain how our choice
of test states (coherent states with a continuum of com-
plex amplitudes) allows in principle to determine Eve’s
POVM elements.
For simplicity, let us concentrate on the case of testing
a measurement device acting on a single mode (rather
than the two-mode case of our protocol). Knowing some
POVM element F˜ is equivalent to being able to predict
the probability p(F˜ ) of the associated outcome for any
input state ρ as p(F˜ ) = Tr
[
ρ F˜
]
. We can now use the
phase-space formalism of quantum mechanics (see, for
example, Refs. [32, 33]) where we use the P -function
representation of ρ =
∫
d2α P (α) |α〉〈α| so that we have
p(F˜ ) =
∫
d2α P (α) 〈α| F˜ |α〉 . (16)
As we see from this equation, knowledge of the function
p(F˜ |α) := 〈α| F˜ |α〉 allows the prediction of p(F˜ ) for all
input states for which the P function of the density ma-
trix ρ exists. So testing the measurement device with
all possible coherent states |α〉 and observing the corre-
sponding probabilities p(F˜ |α) is equivalent to knowing
F˜ .
Actually, using results from [32, 33], one can recon-
struct the operator F˜ explicitly also in cases where the
P function of ρ may not exist. Let us go through the
arguments directly for the POVM elements F γ for the
outcome γ in the two-mode case. We adapt the Eqs
(3.4)-(3.6) from Ref. [33] to our scenario.
By substituting Eqs. (3.4) and (3.6) into Eq. (3.5)
from Ref. [33], we obtain a power series for each F γ as:
F γ =
∞∑
n1,n2,
m1,m2=0
(
∂m1α1 ∂
m2
α2 ∂
n1
α¯1
∂n2α¯2 〈α1, α2|F γ |α1, α2〉
)
|α1=0,α2=0
m1!m2!n1!n2!
× (a1†)n1(a2†)n2a1m1a2m2 ,
(17)
where α1, α2 and their complex conjugated counterparts
α¯1, α¯2 are treated as independent variables, and a1, a1
†,
a2, a2
† are the annihilation and creation operators of the two
modes. Since F γ is a POVM element and thus has bounded
eigenvalues, such series exist and converge [32]. Using the
two-mode test states |α1, α2〉 and the associated observed
8probabilities p(γ|α1, α2) = 〈α1, α2|F γ |α1, α2〉 thus uniquely
determines F γ .
Note that a full description of F γ as shown above is
more than what we actually need since we are only in-
terested in how F γ acts on the subspace span(S), which
is only a four-dimensional space.
For this, we need to be able to calculate off-diagonal
elements of the form 〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉. It is an inter-
esting question of whether we can estimate these ele-
ments well enough with just a few number of coherent
states. (The diagonal elements are directly accessible.)
We present now the handle to attack this question.
We first notice that characterizing F γ on span(S)
is equivalent to the question whether the operator
|β1, β2〉〈α1, α2| can be approximated to arbitrary preci-
sion in the Hilbert-Schmidt norm by the discrete diagonal
coherent state representation [34, 35]:
|β1, β2〉〈α1, α2| =
∞∑
i=1
λi
∣∣∣ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 〉〈ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 ∣∣∣ , (18)
where we use sets of tensor products of coherent states∣∣∣ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 〉 and complex numbers λi ∈ C.
Then, we can write 〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉 as a sum of ob-
served values
〈
ω
(i)
1 , ω
(i)
2
∣∣∣F γ ∣∣∣ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 〉 as
〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉 = Tr(F γ |β1, β2〉〈α1, α2|)
=
∞∑
i=1
λi
〈
ω
(i)
1 , ω
(i)
2
∣∣∣F γ ∣∣∣ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 〉 .
(19)
By appropriate choices of {
∣∣∣ω(i)1 , ω(i)2 〉}Ni=1, we will be
able to get a good approximation by terminating the
summation at N . From the approximation, we will then
determine a set of POVMs compatible with experimen-
tal correlations, which is a neighborhood of the POVM
that Eve actually performed. When we calculate the key
rate in this case, we need to perform the minimization in
Eq. (15). In that case, we may apply numerical meth-
ods [36, 37] to perform the desired optimization. If such
an approximation makes this set of compatible POVMs
small enough, then the key rate with several choices of
test states would be close to the key rate with infinite
choices of test states. We leave the detailed analysis of
finite choices of test states scenario to the future work.
In Appendix A, we will discuss how to represent F γ
in the four-dimensional subspace span(S) after knowing
〈α1, α2|F γ |β1, β2〉 for |α1, α2〉 , |β1, β2〉 ∈ S.
IV. SIMULATION
We perform simulations to study the loss scaling of
this PM-MDI QKD protocol and also the stability of the
protocol.
A. Loss-only scenario
To show that the key rate of this protocol has a scaling
of
√
η with the single-photon transmissivity η between
Alice and Bob, we first study the loss-only scenario. We
simulate the quantum channel as a lossy channel and we
consider the normal situation where Charlie (Eve) per-
forms the measurements so that the observed statistics
during the parameter estimation step is compatible with
Charlie performing the measurement shown in Fig. 1(a).
That is, we calculate the POVM F corresponding to the
real setup. Our protocol can verify via test states in the
test mode that this is the actual POVM performed by
Eve in the loss-only scenario. For the purpose of our pre-
sentation, we consider a symmetric setup, that is, Charlie
is at an equal distance from Alice and Bob, and the loss
in each path is the same. For a total transmissivity η
between Alice and Bob, each segment has the transmis-
sivity
√
η.
In this situation, when Alice sends a coherent state
|αA〉 and Bob sends a coherent state |αB〉 in the same op-
tical mode, the state becomes
∣∣√√ηαA,√√ηαB〉 after
the lossy channel. When Charlie performs the measure-
ment on this state, the probability for each announce-
ment outcome γ can be calculated as follows:
〈αA, αB |F+ |αA, αB〉 = (1− e−
√
η|αA+αB |2
2 )e−
√
η|αA−αB |2
2 ,
〈αA, αB |F− |αA, αB〉 = e−
√
η|αA+αB |2
2 (1− e−
√
η|αA−αB |2
2 ),
〈αA, αB |F ? |αA, αB〉 = e−
√
η|αA+αB |2
2 e−
√
η|αA−αB |2
2 ,
〈αA, αB |F d |αA, αB〉 = (1− e−
√
η|αA+αB |2
2 )(1− e−
√
η|αA−αB |2
2 ).
(20)
Specifically, the conditional probability of each an-
nouncement outcome for each state in the set S is sum-
marized in Table I. From this table, we can directly eval-
uate the classical mutual information I(K : Y ) as
I(K : Y )ρ+KYE
= I(K : Y )ρ−KYE
= 1,
I(K : Y )ρ?KYE = I(K : Y )ρdKYE = 0.
(21)
Clearly, we cannot distill keys from γ = “?” and γ =
“d” announcements. Also, we find δ+EC = δ
−
EC = 0 since
no error correction is needed in this loss-only scenario.
Now, we only need to evaluate χ(K : E) for γ = “ + ”
and γ = “−”. We first find conditional states ρk,y,+E and
ρk,y,−E defined in Eq. (13).
As we can notice from Table I, in the loss-only scenario,
whenever Alice and Bob prepare coherent states with a
pi phase difference, Charlie will never announce γ = “+”
and whenever they prepare coherent states with the same
phase, Charlie will never announce γ = “ − ”. Because
p(0, 1,+) = p(1, 0,+) = 0 and p(0, 0,−) = p(1, 1,−) = 0,
each of the states ρk,+E and ρ
k,−
E ∀k ∈ {0, 1} is a pure
state so that S(ρk,+E ) = S(ρ
k,−
E ) = 0. Therefore, we only
need to evaluate S(ρ+E) and S(ρ
−
E).
9TABLE I. Conditional probability distribution of announce-
ment outcomes given the states from S in the loss-only sce-
nario. η is the single-photon transmissivity between Alice
and Bob and µ is the intensity of coherent states in the key-
generation mode.
αA, αB +
√
µ,+
√
µ −√µ,−√µ +√µ,−√µ −√µ,+√µ
p(+|αA, αB) 1− e−2
√
ηµ 1− e−2√ηµ 0 0
p(−|αA, αB) 0 0 1− e−2
√
ηµ 1− e−2√ηµ
p(?|αA, αB) e−2
√
ηµ e−2
√
ηµ e−2
√
ηµ e−2
√
ηµ
p(d|αA, αB) 0 0 0 0
In this loss-only case,
ρ+E =
1
2
(
∣∣Θ+0,0〉〈Θ+0,0∣∣+ ∣∣Θ+1,1〉〈Θ+1,1∣∣),
ρ−E =
1
2
(
∣∣Θ−0,1〉〈Θ−0,1∣∣+ ∣∣Θ−1,0〉〈Θ−1,0∣∣). (22)
The eigenvalues of ρ+E are
1
2 (1±
∣∣〈Θ+0,0∣∣Θ+1,1〉∣∣) and thus
S(ρ+E) = h(
1−|〈Θ+0,0|Θ+1,1〉|
2 ), where h(x) = −x log2(x) −
(1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function. Simi-
larly, the eigenvalues of ρ−E are
1
2 (1±
∣∣〈Θ−0,1∣∣Θ−1,0〉∣∣) and
thus S(ρ−E) = h(
1−|〈Θ−0,1|Θ−1,0〉|
2 ). Using the definition of∣∣∣Θγk,y〉 in Eq. (14), we obtain
〈
Θ+0,0
∣∣Θ+1,1〉 = 〈+√µ,+√µ∣∣F+ ∣∣−√µ,−√µ〉√〈
+
√
µ,+
√
µ
∣∣F+ ∣∣+√µ,+√µ〉 〈−√µ,−√µ∣∣F+ ∣∣−√µ,−√µ〉 ,〈
Θ−0,1
∣∣Θ−1,0〉 = 〈+√µ,−√µ∣∣F− ∣∣−√µ,+√µ〉√〈
+
√
µ,−√µ∣∣F− ∣∣+√µ,−√µ〉 〈−√µ,+√µ∣∣F− ∣∣−√µ,+√µ〉 .
(23)
Thus, we have S(ρ+E) = S(ρ
−
E) = h(
1−e−4µ(1−
√
η)e−2µ
√
η
2 ).
We provide explicit expressions of F γ for this loss-only
scenario in Sec. B 1 of Appendix B, using which the
reader can check the result directly.
Finally, we obtain the expression of secret key gener-
ation rate as a function of η and the intensity µ in this
loss-only scenario as
R∞ = (1− e−2µ√η)
[
1− h
(1− e−4µ(1−√η)e−2µ√η
2
)]
.
(24)
For small values of η, R∞ ≈ 2µ(1 − h( 1−e−4µ2 ))
√
η.
When we take the optimal value of µ, which is µopt ≈
0.1146, then we find R∞ ≈ 0.0714√η, thus confirming
the rate scaling of R∞ = O(
√
η).
In Fig. 2, the short-dashed line is the asymptotic key
rate of this loss-only scenario as a function of the trans-
mission distance L, where we take η = 10−
0.2L
10 and µ
is optimized for each distance L. The solid line is the
fundamental repeaterless bound − log2(1 − 10−
0.2L
10 ) [5].
This calculation gives an intuitive understanding on how
the PM-MDI QKD can beat the repeaterless key rate
bound. We see that this PM-MDI QKD protocol beats
the repeaterless bound at around 150 km. Our key rate
expression in Eq. (24) is tight for the loss-only scenario.
Therefore, we expect this is the loss limit for PM-MDI
QKD.
B. Realistic Imperfections
It is of practical interest to study how stable this pro-
tocol is in noisy scenarios. In particular, we simulate
the scenario with realistic imperfections in experimen-
tal devices, including the dark counts of detectors, mode
mismatch and phase mismatch, detector inefficiency, and
error correction inefficiency. In this section, we briefly in-
troduce sources of imperfections and corresponding simu-
lation parameters, then explain the correlations that Al-
ice and Bob would observe in our simulation model, and
finally present the results of our key rate calculation. In
Appendix B, we provide more detailed explanations for
the physical model of each imperfection.
For the purpose of presentation, we assume that both
detectors have the same detector efficiency ηd and the
same dark count probability pd. We remark that the
simulation method described in Appendix B is also ap-
plicable to more general situations.
In the ideal implementation of this protocol, Alice and
Bob should prepare coherent states in the same optical
mode, that is, with the same spectral, temporal profiles
and the same polarization, in order to have single-photon
interference at the beam splitter. In reality, since their
states may come from different lasers and pass through
different optical components before reaching the central
node, the modes of their states are not necessarily per-
fectly matched. Thus, we consider the relative mode mis-
match between their states with a simulation parameter
V . In our simulation, if without any mode mismatch, the
state arriving at the central node from Alice and Bob
is supposed to be |αA, αB〉, then with the mode mis-
10
FIG. 2. A log-linear plot for the key rate as a function
of transmission distance. The solid line is the fundamental
repeaterless secret key capacity bound − log2(1−10−
0.2L
10 ) for
a transmission distance L (in km) [5]. The short-dashed line is
the key rate for PM-MDI QKD in the loss-only scenario in Eq.
(24). The long-dashed line is the key rate for PM-MDI QKD
with experimentally feasible parameters listed in Table II. The
dash-dotted line is phase-matching QKD key rate provided by
authors of [12] with the same set of experimental parameters.
The intensity µ is optimized for each distance in these curves.
match, the state becomes
∣∣∣αA,√V αB〉 in the original
mode and
∣∣0,√1− V αB〉 in a second mode. Both modes
enter Charlie’s devices independently.
Another source of imperfection considered in our sim-
ulation model is the phase mismatch. In the key-
generation mode, Alice and Bob are supposed to prepare
states in the set S, which are coherent states with the
same global phase and with the encoding information in
the relative phases. In reality, the global phase is not
guaranteed to be the same when states reach the detec-
tors. Therefore, we consider the situation where there
is a relative phase mismatch between Alice’s signal state
and Bob’s signal state. If without any phase mismatch,
the state is supposed to be |αA, αB〉, then due to the
phase mismatch, the state is changed to
∣∣αA, αBeiδ〉 with
a simulation parameter δ.
Table II lists the choice of parameters in our simula-
tion. In particular, we choose the same values for the
efficiency of a detector ηd and the dark count probabil-
ity of a detector pd as those used in Ref. [12] for the
comparison purpose. We also select pessimistic values
for the mode mismatch and phase mismatch to demon-
strate the feasibility of beating the repeaterless bound
with currently available devices.
We now give the expressions for the probability of each
announcement outcome γ given each choice of the input
state in terms of the simulation parameters V , δ, ηd, and
pd. We define the total transmissivity as η = ηtη
2
d, where
ηt is the channel transmission probability between Alice
TABLE II. Values for simulation parameters. They are exper-
imentally feasible and might be pessimistic values. See main
text for more explanations.
Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
Detector dark count probability pd 8× 10−8
Mode mismatch (1− V ) 5%
Phase mismatch δ pi
60
Error correction efficiency fEC 1.15
and Bob.
〈αA, αB |F+ |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)(1− ξ1ξ2)ξ2ξ3
+ (1− pd)pdξ1ξ22ξ3,
〈αA, αB |F− |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)ξ1ξ2(1− ξ2ξ3)
+ (1− pd)pdξ1ξ22ξ3,
〈αA, αB |F ? |αA, αB〉 = (1− pd)2ξ1ξ22ξ3,
〈αA, αB |F d |αA, αB〉 = pd(1− ξ1ξ2)ξ2ξ3 + pdξ1ξ2(1− ξ2ξ3)
+ p2dξ1ξ
2
2ξ3 + (1− ξ1ξ2)(1− ξ2ξ3),
(25)
where for the simplicity of writing, we have made the
following definitions
ξ1 = e
− 12
√
η|αA+√V αBeiδ|2 ,
ξ2 = e
− 12
√
η(1−V )|αB |2 ,
ξ3 = e
− 12
√
η|αA−√V αBeiδ|2 .
(26)
From Eq. (25), it is straightforward to derive the con-
ditional probability of each announcement outcome given
the state in S. Similar to the loss-only scenario, we also
discover that the mutual information I(K : Y ) is zero for
γ = “ ? ” and γ = “ d ” since the probability of mak-
ing those announcements is independent from the signal
states sent by Alice and Bob in our simulation. Thus,
we only generate keys from γ = “ + ” and γ = “ − ”
outcomes.
We define error rates e+ and e− given the announce-
ment outcome γ = “ + ” and γ = “− ”, respectively.
e+ := p(0, 1|+) + p(1, 0|+)
=
ζ2 − (1− pd)ζ1ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2 − 2(1− pd)ζ1ζ2 ,
e− := p(0, 0|−) + p(1, 1|−) = e+,
(27)
where we define ζ1 = e
−√ηµ(1−√V cos(δ)) and ζ2 =
e−
√
ηµ(1+
√
V cos(δ)).
To take the inefficiency of error correction into consid-
eration, we take the following values for δ+EC and δ
−
EC:
δ+EC = fEC h(e+),
δ−EC = fEC h(e−) = δ
+
EC,
(28)
where fEC is the efficiency of error correction.
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The rest of the task is to find each of ρk,y,+E and ρ
k,y,−
E .
In Appendix B, we give explicit expressions for F in
this scenario. Using Eqs. (B11) and (A3), we can find
the four-dimensional representation of each of ρk,y,+E and
ρk,y,−E . We numerically evaluate the Holevo information
χ(K : E) for γ = “ + ” and γ = “ − ” (even though
it is still possible but non-trivial to evaluate χ(K : E)
analytically).
In Fig. 2, the long-dashed line shows the result of our
simulation. With those experimentally feasible parame-
ters, we see this PM-MDI QKD protocol can still beat the
repeaterless bound and this crossover happens at around
250 km. We also compare our results with the key rates
from Ref. [12] for the same set of experimental parame-
ters. We notice a distinct gap that we attribute to the to-
mographically complete set of test states and to the fact
that our proof technique is tight. Both approaches can
provide stronger advantages over the repeaterless bound
for less pessimistic experimental parameters.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have presented a variation of PM-MDI QKD proto-
col, which uses coherent states (without phase random-
ization) as test states to probe Eve’s attacks and uses
exactly one phase-matching pair of coherent states as
signal states for key generation. From the tomograph-
ical completeness of test states, we can uniquely deter-
mine Eve’s measurement POVM and then derive Eve’s
conditional states needed for the direct evaluation of the
Devetak-Winter formula (no minimization). We calcu-
late the asymptotic key rate of this PM-MDI QKD pro-
tocol against collective attacks in the scenario of infinite
choices of test states. Our analytical key rate formula for
the loss-only scenario confirms that the PM-MDI QKD
protocol has O(
√
η) scaling, better than O(η) scaling of
the fundamental repeaterless bound [5]. It also shows
the loss limit of PM-MDI QKD. In addition, we simulate
the key rate with experimentally feasible parameters (if
not even pessimistic), and show that PM-MDI QKD can
beat the repeaterless bound between roughly 250 km and
400 km. An interesting question for the future work is
whether we can approach this key rate bound by using a
few choices of test states. We also presented a possible
path to proceed with such an analysis. Such an analy-
sis needs to include the study of optimal choices of test
states and the effects on the key rate due to nonunique
determination of Eve’s POVM. We also believe the gen-
eralization of decoy state idea presented in this paper can
be useful for other QKD protocols.
Note added. During the preparation of this paper, we
have presented our protocol, proof idea and main re-
sults in a conference [38]. After our presentation, two
other works considering similar protocols were posted on
a preprint server [21, 22]. In this article, we compared
differences among those similar protocols and showed the
clear distinction. Our initial idea was conceived indepen-
dently from these two works and our analysis has already
finished before the appearance of these two works. We
nevertheless include references to these publications in
our paper for the convenience of the readers.
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Appendix A: A REPRESENTATION OF EVE’S
POVM IN THE SUBSPACE S
In this Appendix, we will describe how to find a repre-
sentation of Eve’s POVM {F γ} in an orthonormal basis
of the subspace spanned by the signal states, which we
previously denoted as span(S). When we discuss about
the two-mode coherent states |αA, αB〉 prepared by Alice
and Bob, for the ease of notation, we write α = (αA, αB)
and |α〉 = |αA, αB〉.
If we are given 〈α|F γ |β〉 for every α,β ∈ S, then
the procedure described here allows us to find a four-
dimensional representation of F γ in the subspace span(S)
and helps us evaluate the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s
conditional states more straightforwardly. We remark
here that the values of 〈α|F γ |β〉 can be determined by
test states in the test mode of our protocol, as discussed
in Sec. III D. For our simulations in Appendix B, we also
provide a simulation method to obtain 〈α|F γ |β〉.
Before we proceed, we want to emphasize that the set
S defined in Eq. (2) is a basis for the subspace span(S)
and we will use this particular ordering of basis elements
in the later discussion.
1. Orthonormal basis decomposition
Since two coherent states {∣∣+√µ〉 , ∣∣−√µ〉} span a
two-dimensional space, we start with a canonical two-
dimensional description of {∣∣+√µ〉 , ∣∣−√µ〉}.
|+√µ〉 = c0 |e0〉+ c1 |e1〉 ,
|−√µ〉 = c0 |e0〉 − c1 |e1〉 , (A1)
where {|e0〉 , |e1〉} is an orthonormal basis, |c0|2+|c1|2 = 1
and |c0|2−|c1|2 =
〈
+
√
µ
∣∣−√µ〉. Without loss of general-
12
ity, we choose c0 and c1 to be real numbers by absorbing
the complex phases into the definitions of |e0〉 , |e1〉. We
remark here that the explicit expressions for |e0〉 and |e1〉
are irrelevant for our discussion, but a canonical choice
of this basis written in the Fock state basis is
|e0〉 = 1√
cosh(µ)
∞∑
n=0
√
µ2n√
(2n)!
|2n〉 ,
|e1〉 = 1√
sinh(µ)
∞∑
n=0
√
µ2n+1√
(2n+ 1)!
|2n+ 1〉 ,
(A2)
and with this choice of basis, c0 = e
−µ2
√
cosh(µ) and
c1 = e
−µ2
√
sinh(µ).
We then obtain a basis for span(S) as B =
{|e0, e0〉 , |e1, e1〉 , |e0, e1〉 , |e1, e0〉}. We remark that this
particular ordering of basis elements is useful for the
presentation and later allows us to see the block diag-
onal structures of some particular POVM elements more
straightforwardly.
We now write out signal states in the set S as column
vectors in this basis B:
|+√µ,+√µ〉 =

c20
c21
c0c1
c0c1
 , |−√µ,−√µ〉 =

c20
c21
−c0c1
−c0c1
 ,
|+√µ,−√µ〉 =

c20
−c21
−c0c1
c0c1
 , |−√µ,+√µ〉 =

c20
−c21
c0c1
−c0c1
 .
(A3)
Once we write out F γ in the basis B, we can then find
Eve’s conditional states in the basis B by appropriate
multiplications. Then the evaluation of von Neumann en-
tropy of conditional states is straightforward since finding
eigenvalues of 4× 4 matrices is computationally simple.
2. Change of basis matrix
Suppose we have determined 〈α|F γ |β〉, where α,β ∈
S. Now we want to write out F γ in the basis B. This
can be done by a change of basis matrix.
We can write |em〉 ∈ B in the basis S:
|em〉 =
∑
n
Anm |αn〉 , (A4)
where Anm is the (n,m) entry of the desired change of
basis matrix A and |αn〉 ∈ S.
Similarly,
〈em| =
∑
n
A¯nm 〈αn| =
∑
n
(A†)mn 〈αn| , (A5)
where A¯nm is the complex conjugate of Anm and A
† is
the Hermitian conjugate of A.
FIG. 3. Explanation of labels for input and output modes
of the beam splitter.
Combining previous two equations, we have
〈em|F γ |en〉 =
∑
i,j
(A†)mj 〈αj |F γ |αi〉Ain. (A6)
In the ordering of S and B, this change of basis matrix
A can be expressed as
A =

1
4c20
1
4c21
1
4c0c1
1
4c0c1
1
4c20
1
4c21
− 14c0c1 − 14c0c1
1
4c20
− 1
4c21
− 14c0c1 14c0c1
1
4c20
− 1
4c21
1
4c0c1
− 14c0c1
 , (A7)
where c0 and c1 are defined from Eq. (A1).
Appendix B: SIMULATION
In this section, we explain how to obtain values of
〈α|F γ |β〉 for |α〉 , |β〉 ∈ S through simulations. After
knowing 〈α|F γ |β〉, we can then use the results from Ap-
pendix A, in particular, Eq. (A6), to express F γ in the
basis B and then proceed with the evaluation of key rate.
To avoid the confusion between our simulation method
and experimental execution of the protocol, we remark
on how to obtain 〈α|F γ |β〉 in the actual implementation
of the protocol. In the parameter estimation step, the
values of 〈α|F γ |α〉 for α ∈ S are directly obtained from
observed correlation. The values of 〈α|F γ |β〉 for α 6= β
can be calculated by observed correlation of test states,
as explained in Sec. III D.
For our simulation, we propagate the input states
through our simulated model of imperfections and then
apply the POVM of detectors to the final states arriving
at the detectors to calculate 〈α|F γ |β〉.
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1. Eve’s POVM associated with loss-only scenario
We now consider the loss-only scenario. Here, we sim-
ulate the quantum channel as a lossy channel and we
consider the normal situation where Charlie (Eve) is hon-
est and performs the measurements shown in Fig. 1(a).
Namely, we calculate the POVM F corresponding to the
real setup with ideal devices at the central node. Our
protocol can verify via test states in the test mode that
this is the actual Eve’s POVM in the loss-only scenario.
As mentioned in the main text, for the purpose of pre-
sentation, we consider the symmetric setup. For a total
single-photon transmissivity η between Alice and Bob,
each path has a transmissivity
√
η.
In this section, we will label Eve’s POVM F γ associ-
ated with the loss-only scenario by adding the subscript
“loss”. As shown in Fig. (3), we will label the input
modes of the beam splitter at the central node as IA
and IB and the output modes as OA and OB , where OA
reaches the detector D+ and OB reaches the detector
D−.
We describe how to obtain 〈α|F γloss |β〉. First,
Alice and Bob prepare coherent states |αA〉A′ and
|αB〉B′ in the registers A′ and B′, respectively, and
send them to Charlie. After the lossy channel, the
state becomes
∣∣√√ηαA,√√ηαB〉IAIB , and Eve has
the state
∣∣√1−√ηαA,√1−√ηαB〉EAEB at her dis-
posal. Then after the beam splitter, the state becomes∣∣∣∣√√ηαA+√√ηαB√2 , √√ηαA−√√ηαB√2
〉
OAOB
. We now apply
the POVM of the detectors to this state.
The ideal detectors are described by the following
POVM:
Π+ideal = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ |0〉〈0|OB ,
Π−ideal = |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB ),
Π?ideal = |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ |0〉〈0|OB ,
Πdideal = (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB ),
(B1)
where 1 is the identity operator and |0〉 is the vacuum
state.
Then, for |α〉 = |αA, αB〉 and |β〉 = |βA, βB〉, we eval-
uate 〈α|F γloss |β〉 as
〈α|F γloss |β〉 =
〈
η
1
4 (αA + αB)√
2
,
η
1
4 (αA − αB)√
2
∣∣∣∣∣Πγideal
∣∣∣∣∣η
1
4 (βA + βB)√
2
,
η
1
4 (βA − βB)√
2
〉〈√
1−√ηαA
∣∣∣∣√1−√ηβA〉
EA
×
〈√
1−√ηαB
∣∣∣∣√1−√ηβB〉
EB
.
(B2)
Now we have obtained values for 〈α|F γloss |β〉 from sim-
ulations, and we can then proceed to write F γloss in the
basis B by using Eq. (A6).
F+loss = (1− ξ2)

1−ξ2Ω2
8c40
1−ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
0 0
1−ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
1−ξ2Ω2
8c41
0 0
0 0 1+ξ
2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
1+ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
0 0 1+ξ
2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
1+ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
 ,
F−loss = (1− ξ2)

1−ξ2Ω2
8c40
−1+ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
0 0
−1+ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
1−ξ2Ω2
8c41
0 0
0 0 1+ξ
2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
−1−ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
0 0 −1−ξ
2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
1+ξ2Ω2
8c20c
2
1
 ,
F ?loss = ξ
2

(1+Ω)2
4c40
0 0 0
0 (1−Ω)
2
4c41
0 0
0 0 1−Ω
2
4c20c
2
1
0
0 0 0 1−Ω
2
4c20c
2
1
 ,
F dloss = 0,
(B3)
where for the ease of representation, we define Ω =
e−2(1−
√
η)µ, and ξ = e−
√
ηµ. Also, c0 and c1 are de-
fined from the decomposition in Eq. (A1). By noting
that 2c20 = 1 + ξ
2Ω and 2c21 = 1 − ξ2Ω, we can easily
check that F+loss + F
−
loss + F
?
loss + F
d
loss = 1.
2. Models for imperfections
In this section, we consider realistic imperfections in
the experimental setup. Specifically, we consider the
mode mismatch, phase mismatch, dark counts of detec-
tors and the inefficiency of detectors. In the following,
we describe the physical models for those imperfections.
a. Mode mismatch
We consider the mode mismatch with a simulation pa-
rameter V . The model of the mode mismatch is that
for a coherent state |α〉1 in a mode 1, due to the mode
mismatch, the state
∣∣∣√V α〉
1
remains in the mode 1 and∣∣√1− V α〉
2
is in the mode 2, which is distinct from the
mode 1. To derive values for 〈α|F γ |β〉, we will propa-
gate the input states, similar to the loss-only case. In the
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place of IA, IB , OA, OB used in the discussion of loss-only
scenario, we will replace them by IA1, IB1, OA1, OB1 for
the initial mode and IA2, IB2, OA2, OB2 for the additional
mode.
Suppose Alice sends |αA〉A′ and Bob sends |αB〉B′ .
Since only the relative mode mismatch between Al-
ice’s mode and Bob’s mode matters, without loss
of generality, we leave the state in the register A′
untouched when it reaches IA1, that is, we have
|αA〉IA1 . Due to the mode mismatch, the state
|αB〉B′ becomes
∣∣∣√V αB〉
IB1
∣∣√1− V αB〉IB2 . Corre-
spondingly, we have the vacuum state in the mode
IA2. To summarize, the state arriving at the beam
splitter of Charlie’s station due to mode mismatch is
|αA, 0〉IA1IA2
∣∣∣√V αB ,√1− V αB〉
IB1IB2
. The mode IA1
interferes with the mode IB1 and the mode IA2 interferes
with the mode IB2 independently. We remark here that
this parameter V can be made close to 1 with experi-
mentally available compensation systems, for example,
see Ref. [39] in the setting of MDI protocols. In partic-
ular, V ≥ 95% is readily achievable.
b. Phase mismatch
Ideally, Alice and Bob should prepare coherent states
with the same global phase. We consider the situation
where there is a phase mismatch between Alice’s sig-
nal state and Bob’s signal state. For the ideal input
state |αA, αB〉A′B′ , due to the phase mismatch, the state
becomes
∣∣αA, αBeiδ〉IAIB for some δ. We expect that
with an experimentally feasible phase compensation sys-
tem, the value of δ is typically small. For instance, the
continuous-variable QKD experiment in Ref. [40] reports
a value less than pi60 .
c. Detector dark count
We now consider dark counts of detectors. For simplic-
ity of our presentation, we model two detectors to have
the same dark count probability pd. It is also straightfor-
ward to model the case where two detectors have different
dark count probabilities.
The effect of dark counts can be taken into consider-
ation by modifying the POVM for detectors. Eq. (B1)
gives the POVM associated with ideal detectors. When
the detectors have dark counts, the associated POVM is
modified as below
Π+dark =(1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
+ pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
=(1− pd)Π+ideal + (1− pd)pdΠ?ideal,
Π−dark =(1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB )
+ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB
=(1− pd)Π−ideal + (1− pd)pdΠ?ideal,
Π?dark =(1− pd) |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1− pd) |0〉〈0|OB
=(1− pd)2Π?ideal,
Πddark =(1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB
+ pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB )
+ pd |0〉〈0|OA ⊗ pd |0〉〈0|OB
+ (1OA − |0〉〈0|OA)⊗ (1OB − |0〉〈0|OB )
=pdΠ
+
ideal + pdΠ
−
ideal + p
2
dΠ
?
ideal + Π
d
ideal.
(B4)
Since in our simulation, we propagate the input states
through the physical models of imperfections to derive
the final states before the detectors and then use the
POVM of detectors to derive the values of 〈α|F γ |β〉,
the expression of 〈α|F γ |β〉 will have a similar structure
as the loss-only case shown in Eq. (B2). From this ob-
servation, we know that once we obtained the expression
of Eve’s POVM element F γ , when we have considered all
other imperfections except dark counts, we can then de-
rive the POVM elements including dark counts of detec-
tors by probabilistic mixtures of F γ , following the same
relation as between Πγdark and Π
γ
ideal.
To illustrate the idea, we give a simple example where
we consider the physical channel to be a lossy channel
and we want to include dark counts of detectors in our
simulation. Since we have derived F γloss in Eq. (B3), we
can derive the expressions of F γdark corresponding to this
simulation as follows:
F+dark = (1− pd)F+loss + (1− pd)pdF ?loss,
F−dark = (1− pd)F−loss + (1− pd)pdF ?loss,
F ?dark = (1− pd)2F ?loss,
F ddark = pdF
+
loss + pdF
−
loss + p
2
dF
?
loss + F
d
loss.
(B5)
d. Detector’s efficiency
We take into account that any practical single-photon
detector has a limited efficiency. In our simulation
method, we can easily modify the POVM of detectors
as in Eq. (B1), to include the efficiency of each detector
separately. However, for simplicity of our presentation,
we assume that both detectors have the same efficiency ηd
so that we can combine the detector’s efficiency and the
channel transmittance by redefining the total transmis-
sivity η. Let ηt refer to the single-photon transmission
probability of the quantum channel between Alice and
15
Bob. Since both detectors have the same efficiency, we
can redefine the total transmissivity η = ηtη
2
d and use
this value of η in the simulation. Then we can still use
the POVM of detectors with the perfect efficiency in our
simulation.
3. Eve’s POVM with those imperfections
As discussed in the previous section, we now take into
consideration the mode mismatch with a simulation pa-
rameter V , and the phase mismatch with a simulation
parameter δ. We consider both detectors have the same
detector efficiency ηd and the same dark count probabil-
ity pd.
We will first derive Eve’s POVM F γmismatch when we
consider both the mode mismatch and the phase mis-
match. Then we derive Eve’s POVM F γmodel when we
include dark counts of detectors as well. Finally, the ef-
fects of detector efficiency is taken into consideration by
a redefinition of η.
For an input coherent state |αA, αB〉A′B′ ,
the state after the lossy channels and mod-
els for the mode mismatch and phase mis-
match becomes
∣∣∣√√ηαA,√√η√V αBeiδ〉
IA1IB1
⊗∣∣0,√√η√1− V αBeiδ〉IA2IB2 and Eve has∣∣√1−√ηαA,√1−√ηαB〉EAEB at her disposal.
Then, the state arriving at the detectors is∣∣∣∣√√ηαA+√√η√V αBeiδ√2 , √√ηαA−√√η√V αBeiδ√2
〉
OA1OB1
⊗∣∣∣∣√√η√1−V αBeiδ√2 ,−√√η√1−V αBeiδ√2
〉
OA2OB2
.
We now introduce the POVM of the ideal detectors
when there are two independent modes entering the de-
tectors due to mode mismatch.
Π+mismatch = (1OA1OA2 − |00〉〈00|OA1OA2)⊗ |00〉〈00|OB1OB2 ,
Π−mismatch = |00〉〈00|OA1OA2 ⊗ (1OB1OB2 − |00〉〈00|OB1OB2),
Π?mismatch = |00〉〈00|OA1OA2 ⊗ |00〉〈00|OB1OB2 ,
Πdmismatch = (1OA1OA2 − |00〉〈00|OA1OA2)
⊗ (1OB1OB2 − |00〉〈00|OB1OB2).
(B6)
Then, for |α〉 = |αA, αB〉 and |β〉 = |βA, βB〉, we first
define
|α˜final〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣η1/4(αA +
√
V αBe
iδ)√
2
,
η1/4
√
1− V αBeiδ√
2
,
η1/4(αA −
√
V αBe
iδ)√
2
,−η
1/4
√
1− V αBeiδ√
2
〉
OA1OA2OB1OB2
,
∣∣∣β˜final〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣η1/4(βA +
√
V βBe
iδ)√
2
,
η1/4
√
1− V βBeiδ√
2
,
η1/4(βA −
√
V βBe
iδ)√
2
,−η
1/4
√
1− V βBeiδ√
2
〉
OA1OA2OB1OB2
.
(B7)
We evaluate 〈α|F γmismatch |β〉 as
〈α|F γmismatch |β〉 = 〈α˜final|Πγmismatch
∣∣∣β˜final〉〈√1−√ηαA∣∣∣∣√1−√ηβA〉
EA
〈√
1−√ηαB
∣∣∣∣√1−√ηβB〉
EB
,
(B8)
where η = ηtη
2
d and ηt = 10
− 0.2L10 for a distance L in km.
Now, we write down F γmismatch in the basis B. For the ease of representation, we define ξ = e−
√
ηµ and Ω =
e−2(1−
√
η)µ as before. We then define
a = (1− ξ(1+
√
V cos δ))ξ(1−
√
V cos δ),
b = (ξ2(1+
√
V cos δ) − ξ(1+
√
V cos δ))ξ(1−
√
V cos δ)Ω2,
c = (ξ1+i
√
V sin δ − ξ)ξΩ,
d = (ξ1−i
√
V sin δ − ξ)ξΩ,
o = (1− ξ(1−
√
V cos δ))ξ(1+
√
V cos δ),
p = (ξ2(1−
√
V cos δ) − ξ(1−
√
V cos δ))ξ(1+
√
V cos δ)Ω2,
q = (ξ1+i
√
V sin δ − ξ)(ξ1−i
√
V sin δ − ξ)Ω,
m = (1− ξ(1+
√
V cos δ))(1− ξ(1−
√
V cos δ)),
n = (ξ2(1+
√
V cos δ) − ξ(1+
√
V cos δ))(ξ2(1−
√
V cos δ) − ξ(1−
√
V cos δ))Ω2.
(B9)
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And, c0 and c1 are again defined from the decomposition in Eq. (A1). Then we have
F+mismatch =

a+b+2c+2d+o+p
8c40
a+b−o−p
8c20c
2
1
0 0
a+b−o−p
8c20c
2
1
a+b−2c−2d+o+p
8c41
0 0
0 0 a−b+o−p
8c20c
2
1
a−b+2c−2d−o+p
8c20c
2
1
0 0 a−b−2c+2d−o+p
8c20c
2
1
a−b+o−p
8c20c
2
1
 ,
F−mismatch =

a+b+2c+2d+o+p
8c40
−a+b−o−p
8c20c
2
1
0 0
−a+b−o−p
8c20c
2
1
a+b−2c−2d+o+p
8c41
0 0
0 0 a−b+o−p
8c20c
2
1
−a−b+2c−2d−o+p
8c20c
2
1
0 0 −a−b−2c+2d−o+p
8c20c
2
1
a−b+o−p
8c20c
2
1
 ,
F ?mismatch = ξ
2

(1+Ω)2
4c40
0 0 0
0 (1−Ω)
2
4c41
0 0
0 0 1−Ω
2
4c20c
2
1
0
0 0 0 1−Ω
2
4c20c
2
1
 ,
F dmismatch =

m+n+2q
4c40
0 0 0
0 m+n−2q
4c41
0 0
0 0 m−n
4c20c
2
1
0
0 0 0 m−n
4c20c
2
1
 .
(B10)
Finally, Eve’s effective POVM corresponding to the mode mismatch, phase mismatch and dark counts of detectors
is given as below
F+model = (1− pd)F+mismatch + (1− pd)pdF ?mismatch, F−model = (1− pd)F−mismatch + (1− pd)pdF ?mismatch,
F ?model = (1− pd)2F ?mismatch, F dmodel = pdF+mismatch + pdF−mismatch + p2dF ?mismatch + F dmismatch.
(B11)
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